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Abstract 
We offer the first informed comparison of two regional mutual credit systems – Sardex and Liberex – 
aimed at sustaining the local economy. Building on previous research on Sardex, we develop an equivalent 
qualitative research investigating both organizers and members of the local circuit in Emilia Romagna. 
Within a theoretical framework that considers money as a social institution, socially and politically con-
structed, we first give an overview of the plurality of existing money pointing out a heated debate over the 
nature of money itself. Then, we move to evaluate whether the same monetary architecture – adopted by 
the two mutual credit systems – concretely comes with a similar social life. We confirm how social life of 
money is strictly intertwined with its monetary architecture by design, and discover how deeply it is also 
rooted in the institutional and relational contexts where it concretely operates. Money differs not only by 
nature and design, but also by context. 
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Introduction 
 
Money is as plural and dynamic in XXI century as probably it has ever been: “The 
money form is not standing still” wrote anthropologist Keith Hart (2001: 237) when dif-
ferent money markets and new electronic payment systems were at dawn. Today, this 
is even truer as technology drove not only many alternatives for payments, but also 
supported the creation of virtual coins such as Bitcoin or Faircoin. Yet, the rising plurali-
ty of money witnessed in the last 30 years originates off a truly rich combination of 
forms, actors and objectives. Voucher, electronic money, local notes or hours are some 
of the actual forms, while local governments, private companies, and community or 
neighborough groups could be the actor promoting very different projects. They could 
aim at developing local economy or serving social policy purposes, at integrating mar-
ginal groups or defining exclusive club membership and promoting environmental 
awareness or customer loyalty.  
Within the changing landscape of existing forms of money, this article focuses on 
complementary currencies and, more specifically, on mutual credit systems, that is to 
say systems for multilateral clearing of debts.  
Section 1 offers an overview of the variety of complementary currencies across 
their forms, actors, and objectives introducing the debate about the nature of money. 
Section 2 and 3 illustrate our case studies – Sardex and Liberex – two Italian mutual 
credit circuits based in Sardinia and Emilia-Romagna. Sardex attracted much attention 
across disciplines – ranging from sociology and economics to anthropology and policy 
studies – and produced research that serves as our benchmark to study Liberex, one of 
the Sardex’s younger sisters1. Section 4 builds on the comparative results of previous 
sections and draws some conclusions. 
 
 
1. One, no one, one hundred thousand? 
 
The plurality of money, and related monetary schemes, is an historical reality signif-
icantly challenged over the last centuries, especially by the establishment of nation-
states and their attempts to create national currencies. The emergence of the U.S dol-
lar is exemplary (Hanson Jones 1980; Carruthers and Babb 1996). As for other coun-
tries, the US government acted upon economic motivations: it needed a national and 
 
1 At the time of writing, 10 other regions in Italy have started their own complementary currency upon 
Sardex’s model and monetary scheme, broadening Sardex’s family, www.sardex.net . 
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unique currency to create an orderly monetary system that strengthens fiscal capacity 
and serves the expanding national market and monetized economy. Yet, the national 
government was also driven by non-pecuniary reasons (Helleiner 2003; 2018). A com-
mon currency was recognized as a crucial step in the construction of the shared identi-
ty that served the nationalist sentiment of the times. Citizens could learn about their 
history and cultivate a deeper sense of trust and belonging to the ‘imagined communi-
ty’ of a newly born nation (Anderson 1983).  
For the purposes of this article, we draw two observations from this story. First, cur-
rencies and their monetary schemes serve both economic (creating a common lan-
guage for economic practices) and social objectives (constructing mutual trust and 
identity). Second, a national currency did not impede money to diversify following the 
ebbs and flows of a long-term process. As a matter of fact, money is not a thing but it is 
a process as (many) sociologists and (some) economists hold (Zelizer 2005; Dodd, 2014; 
Mazzuccato 2018). Since social relations are its fabric, money changes over time and is 
capable of reinvention (Dodd 2014) because of the complex relationship between so-
cial and economic dynamics. As better explained in Section 1.2, the nature of money is 
a hot topic for discussion, but here, suffice it to say, we consider money as a social rela-
tion between creditors and debtors, a different position compared to those who con-
sider money serving only specific economic functions and those who interpret money 
privileging a cultural definition.  
 
 
1.1. The plurality of money 
 
There are multiple ways of disrupting the supposed neutrality and uniformity of 
money brought along by the expansion of modern monetary systems that tend to ho-
mogenise their respective financial spaces.  
The ground-breaking work of Zelizer (1994) discovered how people order, signify 
and compartmentalize money by creating conventions that distinguish – for example – 
pin money from blood or gift money. Further research in this direction discovered new 
fields and practices for organizing money through its uses, sources and meanings: in 
the art (Velthuis 2005), blood and organs markets (Healy 2006); via accounting systems 
spurred by morals and emotions (Bandelj 2009; Bandelj et al. 2018) or triggered in cru-
cial moments over life-stage transitions (Wherry 2018). Thus, money is not neutral, it is 
relationally and contextually defined and it comes with “strings attached” (Zelizer 
1994, 169). It also shows a – barely investigated –emotional power in shaping collective 
representations (Pixley et al. 2014). 
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Along with a stratification of different uses of money, a financial crisis is usually - 
but not exclusively – a potent and universal trigger for innovation in monies and mone-
tary schemes. The great challenges posed by the Big Depression in the Thirties called 
for local monetary schemes such as scripts, but also lighter and contingent shortages of 
coins in the Nineteenth century stimulated local businesses, associations, churches and 
local towns to issue their own money (for the Usa, see Diehl 1937; Carruthers and Babb 
1996) or Labor Exchange system (for UK, see Owen 1972). More recently, there has 
been a flourishing of experiments2 varying from mutual credit schemes (WIR and Sar-
dex) to time-based local paper currencies (Ithaca Hours) and local exchange trading 
systems (LETS).3 
The wide range of investigated triggers is not exclusively related to the outburst of 
an economic crisis, but also to positive motivations of social change and resilience. 
There are local economies that act as lifeboats against globalization’s economic re-
structuring (Pacione 1997); promote local re-embedding and community building 
(Thorne 1996; North and Longhurst 2013) as well as economic and financial inclusion 
(Lee 1996; Lee et al. 2004; Seyfang 2002). Some local schemes encourage sustainable 
development (Seyfang 2001) and micropolitical challenges to capitalism (North 1999, 
2007; Dini and Kioupliosis 2019). In other cases, monetary innovations are traceable 
back to the growth of the informal economy (Offe and Heinze 1992), to peer group’s 
lending arrangements (like the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh: Biggart 2001) or forms of 
rotating savings and credit associations (Andener and Burman 1995).  
Compared to previous examples, late Twentieth century Western countries’ exper-
iments lost their ‘emergency character’ acquiring in stability over time, complementari-
ty (to the legal tender) and diversity of involved social groups (from the economically 
marginal to the countercultural), while experiences in the global South do still emerge 
from economic crisis, interest more weak social strata (Fare and Ahmed 2017) and are 
perceived as a tool for income generation and welfare improvement (for South Ameri-
ca, see Gomez 2015). In this article, our focus narrows on business-to-business mutual 
credit schemes, like Wir and Sardex, one of the many forms a complementary curren-
cies (CCs) could come on stage with.4  
 
2 All around the world, but we focus on Europe and Us contexts. 
3 In 1980, during an economic downturn, Michael Linton invented LETS on Vancouver Island as a mutual 
credit system focused on individuals, with only few local businesses as members. The Black Monday crash 
in 1987 led to the development of different LETS in the UK and, later in the Nineties, to a similar scheme in 
France (SEL: Systemes d’Echanges Locaux). A Time bank, instead, credits the time someone works for 
someone else on a person-hour basis. 
4 Blanc (2000; 2011; 2018), Martignoni (2012), Boonstra et al. (2013) and Fare and Ahmed (2017) are 
among those who grappled with the variety of emerging and overlapping classificatory schemes.  
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1.2. The nature of money 
 
One may wonder about the real nature of money since it could take so many shapes 
and forms. Yet, there is no easy answer. This is why it is important to connect issues 
about the nature of money to those of complementary currencies. Sociologist Geoffrey 
Ingham (2004) accurately accounted how the question of the nature of money got lost 
over decades of methodological battles within the realm of social sciences. On the one 
hand, classical economists like Adam Smith thought of money as a mere intermediary, 
a medium of exchange that disappears when its work is done5 (Keynes 1923), while 
neoclassical economics defined three – equivalently important – functions of money 
(unit of account, medium of exchange and store of value), which sum up what money 
does, not its nature. On the other hand, money was considered an economic phenom-
enon, not ‘sociological enough’ to deserve a sociological analysis of its origins (Collins 
1979). All attention went to what money does in economics and its cultural significance 
in sociology and anthropology. 
To our purposes, the ontology of money is a central question because its nature is 
embodied in the monetary arrangements that take so many forms in the real world. In 
each CC, the rules of the game concretely reflect the concept of money, define its 
technical functions, and highlight its sociological implications. Following Ingham’s insti-
tutional theory of money, we interpret money as a social institution grounded on cred-
it-debt relations (Amato and Fantacci 2012). It is a trust-based relation that reflects 
values and reciprocal expectations about credit and debt under a monetary scheme. 
This perspective about money stands in between the commodity and the credit theo-
ries of money. The former goes back to Aristotle that understands money in terms of a 
precious commodity, like gold, that facilitates barter exchanges and it encapsulates a 
commodity-based relation. The latter, especially rooted in anthropological research, 
pinpoints how credit preceded money, barter and the creation of market exchange: 
money is essentially a unit of account to keep track of a complex bundle of credits and 
debts within a community. 
Our understanding of money as a social institution has the benefit of better explaining 
the plurality of money and its social life. Considering money through its functions or 
the commodity theory catches only parts of a monetary scheme, leaving out all the so-
cial arrangements that come with it (all strings attached). In the example of CCs, the 
‘community’ complements the mere monetary scheme in ways that only a notion of 
money as socially constructed could help shading light on. Money is always ‘a socially 
 
5 This is the central idea at the core of his Bretton Woods’ (rejected) proposal about a Clearing Union for 
international exchanges, for details see Amato and Fantacci (2012). 
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(including politically) constructed promise’ (Ingham 2004, 198) among debtors and 
creditors. In the case of a mutual credit system, the clearing house performs such a rel-
evant role that it could be compared to an institution: not only it defines the rules of 
the game, but also it sets up and organizes the community in fundamental ways, as we 
will see in Sections 2 and 3. 
 
 
2. Sardex: a mutual credit complementary currency 
 
Section 1 highlighted how plurality and heterogeneity of money are not vestiges of 
the past, but features of contemporary capitalistic economies. Whether triggered by 
compelling economic crisis or alternatives views of society and market exchange, under 
the label of ‘complementary currencies’ there is a wide array of monetary schemes. 
The mutual credit system represents the monetary arrangement upon which our two 
cases studies – Sardex and Liberex – are imagined and developed. One common trait of 
the growing literature is that it acknowledges the multidimensional – both economic 
and social – nature of CCs (Sartori and Dini 2016; Doria and Fantacci 2018). This section 
offers an overview of economic and sociological insights about Sardex that will serve as 
a benchmark for studying Liberex. We first offer a synthetic account of how Sardex 
came into being (2.1), then highlight the main features of its monetary scheme (2.2) 
and continue with its social life revolving around circuit, trust and community (2.3). 
 
 
2.1. Sardex turns ten in 2020  
 
If at the end of 2010 250 SMEs members made up for a total of 177.000 transac-
tions, in 2018 3235 firms transacted 44.880.699 times. Everything started in 2009 when 
the economic crisis was hitting Italy – and especially Sardinia – very hard. The idea of 
Sardex came along with a personal interest in international monetary systems and the 
discovery of WIR, a complementary currency founded in 1934 in Switzerland and still 
working today.6 The four young entrepreneurs – none of whom is an economist or 
technologist by training – shared a vision for an alternative type of economy that could 
reconnect and re-activate a traditionally poorly performing local market. Among many 
 
6 WIR was founded in 1934, as a reaction to the lack of money, one of the Great Depression’s implications 
(Studer 1998). WIR is short for Wirtschaftsring, German for «economic circle», but also means «we» in 
German, emphasizing both economic as well as community and solidarity aspects of the currency. After 
several changes over the years, WIR now operates as a cooperative bank to local SME’s. 
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options (Section 1), they picked the mutual credit as the organizing principle of the 
scheme that they wanted to develop in Sardinia. It was deemed the best tool to organ-
ize a virtuous network of economic exchanges sustaining local demands while compen-
sating money scarcity. To this end, the scheme was purposely designed with precise 
technicalities and rules that directly reflected their overall vision as well as the concep-
tion and the goals money should serve.7 Indeed, the founders envisioned how the 
dramatic implications of the 2007-2008 financial crisis would worsen a territory usually 
characterized by economic ‘pressing problems’ that – when intersecting capitalist mar-
kets – are the main reason for alternative and complementary currencies – as Zelizer 
(2005, 24) would contend.  
As many authors showed (Pinna 1971; Bottazzi 1999; Barbagli and Santoro 2004), 
Sardinia’s economy – characterized by agriculture and tourism, local markets and state-
led industries – always lagged behind compared to other regions. Limited innovation 
and entrepreneurship are attributed to closed communities and family-oriented busi-
nesses that follow a long-term disposition to individualistic behaviour. The novelty, 
which turned out to be successful, was to design and implement a brand new tool to 
tackle old local problems within a more general, but innovative, project that recalled 
Neil Fligstein’s metaphor about market institutions as «a cultural project in several 
ways» (1996, 657).  The ‘vision’ of the founders was a “cultural and political project” 
because it addressed the firms’ reciprocal need to match supply and demand in a low-
trust environment, combining economic tasks with social values (Sartori and Dini 2016; 
Dini et al. 2017). In other words, the founders were capable to choose the right mone-
tary architecture to serve their cultural and political vision. 
 
2.2. Sardex: how it works 
 
Mutual credit systems involve only business to business transactions, mainly among 
SME, in a delimited territory. Naturally bounded as an island could be and with a clear 
vision in mind, the organizers constructed the circuit step by step: once received a 
membership request, there is a check for solidity, creditworthiness and activity8 that 
defines the annual fee. The applicant is granted a credit line with a floor for negative 
and a top for positive balances, whose respect is detailed in the contract’ section on 
the rules of behaviour the firm has to sign before operating.  
 
7 As mentioned in paragraph 1.2, the nature of money cannot be uncoupled from the overall vision that 
the schemes pursue.  
8 Organizers closely scrutinize applicant’s profiles in order to avoid duplication or overlapping products and 
services for a balanced and varied internal market.  
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Once economic agents paid their membership, they start trading good and services. 
For example, a lawyer could offer his consultancy on a contract a member is about to 
sign and he could spend his earned credits on job’s requirements (like stationary ex-
penses) or personal expenses (like a restaurant or supermarket). The latter are admis-
sible since they are covered by other member’s core businesses.  
One important feature of B2B mutual credit schemes is that no single individual is 
allowed to operate within the system in contrast to LETS or Time Banks schemes. All 
transactions develop over an electronic platform, making them traceable and transpar-
ent while facilitating the subsequent tax payment (in Euro) to the Italian state. Also, 
there is nominal value equivalence between Sardex and Euros, but no convertibility. All 
credits earned have to be spent within the circuit in a 12 months period: in case of 
drop-out (not renewing the membership) credits are lost and negative balances must 
be repaid in Euro.  
Two additional characteristics of this monetary architecture are crucial for under-
standing its economic functioning. The first refers to the absence of interest, the sec-
ond to the principle of clearing. The absence of interest is a design characteristic meant 
to give a boost to exchange, because stocking credits becomes pointless. As a result, 
the velocity of circulation of a CC with no interest rate could be much higher than the 
official currency (Gelleri 2009; De la Rosa and Stodder 2015): in 2018 Sardex circulated 
4.8 times more than Euro. In line with Adam Smith, Keynes once said that “money as it 
ought to be” corresponds to a mere intermediary and it fundamentally differs from 
“money as we know it” that is systematically hoarded and withdrawn from circulation. 
The absence of interest is thus purposely meant to support circulation of money to 
tackle, for example, the absence of liquidity in times of economic crisis. In other words, 
in this scheme the function of store of value is deliberately weaker by design compared 
to the other two. 
The principle of clearing is the second crucial feature of this monetary architecture, 
allowing for a periodic balancing of all credits and debts created within the circuit. In 
the act of buying or selling goods and services, all members should pursue a zero bal-
ance because – coupled with the absence of an interest rate – it sustains a constant 
supply and demand matching. Within a multilateral network of exchange, the role of 
organizers is paramount: not only to scouting, evaluating and selecting members by 
number and type, but also to acting as clearing center that guarantees the stability of 
the whole circuit.  
One strong implication of these remarks is that this mutual credit system contra-
dicts the supposed neutrality of the money (and its three functions): money can be de-
signed by virtue of its nature. As such, money confirms to be a social (and political) 
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construction whose core is a ‘promise to repay’ (Ingham 2004) or a ‘claim upon society’ 
(Simmel 2005). 
Sardex exactly goes in this direction: it was designed to avoid hoarding and bottle-
necks in money circulation; to support exchange; and to periodically discharge credits 
and debts.9 It should also be evident that innovative monetary architectures, such as 
the one under scrutiny, can avoid reproducing the weaknesses of official currencies 
(Amato and Fantacci 2012) and contribute to the overall macrostability thanks to the 
countercyclical effect of a better-designed currency (Stodder 2009; Kalinosky 2011; 
Stodder and Lietaer 2016). Moreover, specific social and institutional features try to 
counterbalance the main causes of failure in local experiments: that is to say, reliance 
on voluntarism and decreasing enthusiasm among participants as times goes by (Sey-
fang 2002; Collom 2005 for an overview on LETS and Time Banks) or some kind of regu-
latory intervention (Gomez 2013 for the Argentinian case). 
A concluding remark should underline that, for the above reasons, money can be 
certainly designed, and – depending on how money (with its functions and its mean-
ings) is conceived – one scheme could be better suited than another to foster goals 
such as sustainability, inclusion or local development. However, all that glitters, it is not 
gold. How it will be clearer later on, any monetary scheme bears a social dimension 
that should not be overlooked, because it does not work automatically and according-
ly: Liberex shows that a massive investment in the community is needed for making the 
scheme work. 
 
2.3. Sardex: circuit, trust and community  
 
The circuit. As sociologist Randall Collins (2000, 18) observes, “there are a variety of 
currencies in practice confined to certain social and material advantages in restricted 
circuits of exchange”. These are circuits of commerce, also known as “Zelizer circuits”. 
Here, we are to not only talking about varied social practices about money (such as 
earmarking, Zelizer 1994), but to frame these practices within a monetary architecture 
imagined and developed for realizing a specific vision of economic and social revitaliza-
tion of a local territory (Section 2.1). Zelizer fine-tuned the concept of circuit of com-
merce in terms of media, transfers and social relations (2005; 2010; 2012). Circuits are 
distinctive social structures with their own dynamics, far from being an ‘imperfect mar-
ket, an institutional context for market transactions or a non-market system of ex-
 
9 Within this monetary scheme, credit and debts should not be thought toward a specific person, but to 
the community: this is the only way to grasp the meaning of a multilateral exchange system with a periodic 
clearing. 
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change’ (Zelizer 2005, 318).  
Previous research on the social life of Sardex found that it borders on a Zelizer cir-
cuit and its features (Sartori and Dini 2016). A circuit has well-defined margins separat-
ing members from non-members, it exerts control over exchanges across boundaries, it 
includes transfers that involve the use of a specific medium of exchange and ties 
among participants highlight shared meanings. Zelizer acknowledges the existence of 
an institutional structure that organizes the circuit, but Sardex SPA transcends applica-
tions and examples studied as Zelizer circuits. From constructing a diverse and sustain-
able market to arrange and build the community around it, Sardex – as an organization 
– plays as the uniting element in the circuit, simulating the role of a central institution. 
So, Sardex – as a network – could be benchmarked to a Zelizer circuit as for the rele-
vance of social relations, trust and money practices that differ from the ones organizing 
around official legal tenders. 
Trust. If Sardinia had a low level of social capital, such as a lack of trust among SMEs 
that impeded a healthy development of the local market, it was a problem both rela-
tional and collective in nature, reflecting two big strands of literature on this topic. One 
the one side, social capital is encapsulated in the network of relations (Granovetter, 
1985; Burt 1992) that sustains economic local development.  On the other side, it re-
fers to trust at the collective level that serves to tie the community up (Putnam 2000). 
Social capital could also come as bonding, bridging or linking. If its exclusive nature 
could lead to a closed-in structure, bonding social capital also helps people ‘get by’, of-
fers norms, trust and social support. As a lubricant, bridging social capital connects 
people across boundaries, helps them ‘get ahead’ and is mainly reproduced through 
memberships. Linking social capital describes relationships within a hierarchy of power 
(like in a classic patron/client or mentor/mentee situation, Schneider 2006). It develops 
over time through shared cultural values regarding service provision and long term 
trusting relationships (Claridge 2018).  
Within the context of Sardex, the CC supplemented and filled low local levels of so-
cial capital with both its economic and social dimensions. The former promoted indi-
vidual trust through economic exchange by specific design features while the latter 
sustained a vibrant community built around a generalized trust.  
The economic side supplies and revitalizes a weaker local market while the social of-
fers new lifeblood to a community that believes in the ability of social values to 
strengthen economic exchange. In both cases, the role of organizers was essential to 
incentivize participation and exchange through mutual trust. Its broker structure – also 
recognized as relevant in Time Banks (Gregory 2009) and non-profit sectors (Schneider 
2009) – facilitated the production of trusted relationship, providing the linking form of 
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social capital. 
Community. Since the very beginning, Sardex cultural and political project also fore-
saw a more distributed governance across the circuit over time where members could, 
eventually, co-participate in the circuit’s ownership. Once the community is established 
and autonomous, members are given more agency and voice to govern the democratic 
process underlining the maintenance of the community. When asked, members were 
likely to share such a role because not only they felt responsible toward the communi-
ty, but also they wanted to pay it back as if they felt in ‘debt’ for the good the commu-
nity brought about. This perfectly reflects the concept of money as social institution 
embodied in the monetary scheme and the feeling of empowerment as the circuits 
grows and performs accordingly. 
 
 
3. Liberex: circuit, trust and community 
 
The mutual credit system in Emilia-Romagna was born in 2014, but a management 
change put it at work only in 2016. The detailed description about Sardex (2.1 and 2.2) 
makes the characteristics of Liberex self-evident: it adopted both the same monetary 
scheme and the alternative vision for the local economy. Slow at the beginning, the ac-
tual growth of Liberex is steady: at the beginning of 2019 there are 443 members 
transacting 7.249.842 Liberex compared to 49 exchanging 157.826 Liberex in 2014. 
This section aims at illustrating the Liberex case study in order to build up the first 
informed comparison between two identical schemes. To this end, the research design 
and methodology are equivalent to the Sardex study where both the organizers of the 
local circuit and some SMEs members were in-depth interviewed.10 The central re-
search question relates to the social life of Liberex: since it shares the same monetary 
architecture (the economic dimension), do we register a similar sociality (the social di-
 
10 The fieldwork was conducted in July 2018 and allowed for 27 semi-structured interviews in Bologna and 
Forlì, chosen among a list of members’ contacts that Liberex.net provided. Contacts were listed trying to: 
represent Liberex composition bearing in mind that enterprises are geographically clustered in Bologna 
and its province (almost 50%); respect the Bologna’s greater diversity by interviewing retailers, distributors 
and service providers and professionals; consider first comers and younger memberships, degree of ac-
tiveness within the circuit. The interview script was adapted and updated from the one used in previous 
research on Sardex jointly conducted with Paolo Dini. In this case, Matteo Vanzini, at that time Master 
student candidate at the University of Birmingham, helped me in the conduction and transcription of in-
terviews, which were also used for his final dissertation in 2018. I personally thank Paolo Piras, Liberex 
Ceo, and Fabio Scarselli (Community Trade Advisor) for the time dedicated to share information and de-
tails on Liberex local circuit. 
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mension) developed and organized around an engaged community? We hypothesise a 
positive answer. With this in mind, we focus on the same three points highlighted for 
Sardex – circuit, trust and community – asking whether Liberex resembles a Zelizer cir-
cuit, how it produces trust and how its organization concretely works. 
 
 
3.1. The circuit 
 
Following the clear conditions Zelizer (2005) poses to circuits of commerce, Liberex 
stands in between. For sure, it has well-defined boundary enacting control over trans-
actions: initially the geographic limits of Emilia-Romagna region defined where mem-
bers could transact. Considering the overall transformation of Sardex and the emer-
gence of its circuit’s sisters, today members can stretch the reach of their transactions 
to other networks (a local restaurant in Bologna could spend its earned credits in an 
hotel in Sardinia), even though the core business insists and remains at the local level. 
This is consistent with the idea, which reinforces the local community and economy, 
behind this kind of CC. Other conditions about a distinctive set of transactions through 
the use of a specific medium of exchange are ingrained in the monetary scheme that 
structures Liberex. But when it comes to shared meanings among participants the pic-
ture unravels. If in Sardex there was a strong propensity to join the network because – 
in addition to the economic opportunity – it offered a cultural project, a vision about 
Sardinian future, in Liberex it lags behind. Not without difficulties, local firms quickly 
understood this encompassing project and seized this opportunity to join the network, 
because Sardex had a specific identity strongly rooted in the Sardinian culture. As one 
of the Sardinians interviewees back then acknowledged “Sardex was imagined by Sar-
dinians for their very local needs”, enhancing cohesion through their cultural identity. 
On the contrary, Liberex’s commercial network could not count on such strong local 
identity, although the search for a reinforced identity – as expression of the community 
and shared meanings – is convincingly advocated by some participants: 
 
#9. Liberex needs to support an identitarian twist [pushing for it]. One way 
could be to choose a more precise ‘identity’ …based on… like the organic or 
ethical consumption [and production]. It would strengthen the community. 
 
#11. Liberex would need a step further in the political sense: [it should go] 
beyond the economy and into doing some ‘philosophy’. Let’s start to design 
the future we imagine!”. 
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A comparative exercise between Liberex, Sardex and a generic Zelizer circuit offers 
some additional remarks. Differently from a Zelizer circuit (whose form widely varies), 
Liberex and Sardex have the same monetary architecture, which implies a central clear-
ing house and a detailed set of rules. The latter profoundly limits the chances of rene-
gotiating transactions and the values attached to them, an ordinary practice in a Zelizer 
circuit. Moreover, Liberex and Sardex do only play in a market-oriented context, while 
Zelizer circuits also operate in extra-economic spheres, like (other types of) local cur-
rencies and provision of personal care. Yet, differently from Sardex and many Zelizer 
circuits, Liberex is not created “‘at the intersections between capitalist markets and 
pressing problems”: it was a copycat of a successful experiment replanted in a region 
not comparable in terms of economic, social and cultural features, although affected by 
the 2007-2008 crisis.  
Overall, Liberex does not resemble a Zelizer circuit as Sardex did at the time of Sar-
tori and Dini’s study (2016). Sardex was born as a mutual credit system whose social 
dimension, made of shared meanings and mutual awareness, naturally kicked in – like 
in a Zelizer circuit – and strongly contributed to Sardex’s success as a complementary 
currency. Liberex was identically set up as a mutual credit system, but its social life is 
yet to be built.  
3.2. Trust  
 
Trust is essential to the circuit, both in the initial engagement and normal function-
ing. Some firms entered the circuit, because they knew some other member or they 
had a previous personal contact with either one organizer or broker.  
In contrast to Sardex, our interviews reveal that personal trust in other members 
has a limited thrust among the motivations to join the circuit, because there is no such 
a rooted veil of diffidence to breach when it comes to innovation in Emilia Romagna, 
which is one of the best economically performing regions, it is the land where coopera-
tivism was born and where associations score one of the highest rates in Italy.  
Few among Liberex members knew each other at the beginning, but rapidly came to 
trust one another through both economic exchanges and local social gatherings. The 
latter results an essential activity for building up trust and constructing the community. 
As a matter of fact, more than individual pre-existing relationships or repeated ex-
changes, trust springs from the mediation LiberexSPA carries out through its structure 
of brokers. Firms trust the organization for selecting the ‘right’ good and services to be 
part of the circuit, for guaranteeing exchanges and for preventing insolvency.  
#1. There is a set of relations and contacts that we preserve. They bring light 
to us. It is an entry ticket that “guarantees” you. Somebody else scouted and 
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selected, there is no need for creaming off. In these circuits there is recipro-
cal respect. [That’s why] I trust more somebody already in. 
 
Firms also trust the creation of opportunities for exchange while supplying human 
contact and organizational support within a protected and healthy environment.  
 
#24. The Liberex staff offers presence, collaboration and support. In this 
sense, they are very human, available to you, far from something ‘institu-
tional’ [like a municipality]. They are angels to your business: this is THE ad-
vantage for me and what makes the difference between Liberex and BNI 
(Business Network International). 
 
All things considered, trust is also the by-product of supervising and sanctioning 
that can, eventually, be enforced. In a region where social capital (in terms of both re-
lational and generalized trust) is abundant, the organizational role attributed to Liberex 
is nevertheless key to construct and make the mutual credit circuit flowing. 
 
#3. Being in the circuit leads to trust, because I chose this currency. Euro was 
forced on me. 
 
#24. It is good to be inside the network. It seems like a condo, like a protect-
ed environment. There are no banks to bum you. I lean to trust more struc-
tures like Liberex. Then, does Liberex guarantee you getting paid? Oh yes! If 
only the same could happen within the Euro… 
 
Trust, then, not only nurture the ties that members of the circuit construct and use 
for transactions, but it bonds the community around the mutual credit system. At the 
moment, trust mainly stems from the relationship built between members and the or-
ganizers as the social life of the circuit grows: it takes the form of generalized trust (to-
wards the community) thanks to the crucial role of a third-party that acts a guarantor. 
In terms of social capital, the latter is supporting a linking form of social capital that 
supplements the lack of a bonding economic community.  
Many interviews revealed a ‘social misunderstading’ of the currency as Liberex is 
perceived as a medium of exchange instrumentally used to economic ends. 
 
#14: It is [just] a medium of exchange. I see a lot of people entering the cir-
cuit with no ideals, but with purpose and personal interest.  
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#1. Before changing your trusted personal supplier – dentist or a doctor – 
you think all over it. Being a member does not mean I change and come to 
you: easily said it is not easily done. 
 
This misalignment with the monetary architecture helps explaining why the role of 
guarantor is much of importance. If Liberex is interpreted as an instrumental tool for 
personal benefit, the underlying idea of money is through its functions. Rather, when 
money is conceived as a social relation between creditor and debtor, the monetary ar-
chitecture relies on a community, a social dimension, that cannot be forgotten, without 
loosing the true implications of a mutual credit system. 
 
 
3.3. Community 
 
A closer look at organizers and members – both parts of a thriving community in 
Sardex – reveals a different scenario for Liberex. 
3.3.1. The organizers 
 
The rules of monetary architecture are understood and put in practice though the 
constant effort of brokers who match supply and demand, talk into new clients about 
novel spending habits and promote participation through periodic social gatherings. 
Organizers guarantee the working mechanism of the mutual credit scheme, while bro-
kers are essential to creating linking social capital and enforcing forms of control and 
accountability.  
 
#20. The best thing is to rely on a territorial network that raises your chances 
of meet up and reach out. 
 
#13. One good thing about Liberex is that if a member is not solvent or does 
not play by the rules, he could be suspended. This is a guarantee, a positive 
characteristic.  
 
Firms behave and keep on track thanks to broker’s activity, which is considered the 
crucial added value to membership, differentiating a mutual credit system from an al-
ternative economy framework – such as SCEC. As one of Liberex’s earliest members 
that engaged in previous experiments testifies: 
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#4. With SCEC11 we wanted to offer an economic stimulus to small retailers, 
strangled by the organized big distribution. It lacked of a brokers’ commer-
cial and operational chain that [instead] Liberex has: they look out for new 
clients, but overall they organize social gatherings that create trust within 
the community. Liberex is similar, but it operates at a more professional lev-
el, it is better organized and implemented.  
 
When it comes to governance, Liberex offers a substantially different scenario. The 
idea that members could gain a more active and participatory role within the circuit 
leaves them indifferent, if not reluctant. 
 
#12: Governance? It is better when each member does its own, it is [defi-
nitely] a Liberex’s task. 
 
#18: If on the one side, having a participated and distributed governance 
would be nice and right, on the other, any member like myself would think “I 
have many things to care about, family, life, work….”. It would be really nice, 
but very difficult in reality. With them [Liberex], I feel free. If I see something 
wrong, I say it out loud. In many cases, background noise prevails: a [direct] 
democracy where ‘everybody’ decides everything, it does not work. 
 
The burden of governance is totally on the organizers: members do recognize their 
fundamental organizational role, do not feel responsible and put on them the tasks and 
efforts needed to sustain the community’s governance in a bigger picture.  
 
#23: There are events without content, but delivering a vision. [The organiz-
ers] say “come on everybody and let’s talk about it”. Each member goes, giv-
ing his ideas. After that, you NEED to have a smart mind that collects and or-
ganizes those ideas, giving them a structure. A real governance… [needs] 
somebody that is responsible for these decisions: supporting and further ad-
vancing somebody’s else ideas. Not like a commander-in-chief, but a like a 
bunch of deckhands working their asses off to make the boat go where the 
commander wants to. The community suggests while the organizers should 
structure. The governance needs to be commonal, but structured. 
 
If in Sardex, members sympathized for a long-term distributed governance and 
were willing to ask for more agency in the circuit, in Liberex they do not. They 
 
11 Scec (Solidarietà ChE Cammina), born in 2008, is made ‘by people for the people’ who desire a better 
world through civic engagement and aware economic actions, http://www.arcipelagoscec.net/chi-siamo 
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acknowledge the practical difficulties of such a job and attribute it to the organizers 
that, not only have they to exercise their structural economic role, but also act as the 
social constructing agent of the mutual credit system, pairing with Ingham’s notion of 
money as a ‘socially constructed promise’. 
Overall, the role of the organization is the same as in Sardex, but it needs to come 
to terms with such a different context, naturally bearing a thriving economic environ-
ment, but neither regional identity nor strong identitarian roots. Without the organiz-
ers, the still-in-the-making young community would crumble, but it shows potential to 
consolidate. Nevertheless, the job that Liberex is facing requires a massive investment 
in the construction of the community. 
 
 
3.3.2. The members  
 
The world of motivations about joining a mutual credit system like Liberex is nu-
anced and multi-layered, supported by a literature that goes from the power of struc-
ture (Burt 1992; Kadushin 2012) and belonging (Smith and Lewis 2016) to alternative 
visions of capitalistic societies (Seyfang and Longhurst 2012; Dini and Kioupkiolis 2019). 
Empirical findings support three main types of motivation to join: economic, communi-
tarian and territorial. 
 
Motivation to join: economic  
 
This is no surprise that economic motivation drives in joining a network whose mis-
sion is to make the local economy stronger. Here, what is interesting is how economic 
motivation is declined and interpreted: it primarily refers to the effectiveness of eco-
nomic action, which means to make business contacts and to benefit from them.  
In line with the typical ‘safety’ feature of network belonging, in Sardex the econom-
ic motivation was a primer driver to join the network: especially 10 years ago, one 
could join to shelter from difficult situations, favouring economic and social resilience 
during hard times.  
This does not seem the case for Emilia-Romagna: the economic reason to join re-
lates more to the strategies businesses have to seek and reach out, to transform new 
contacts into clients. 
Moreover, in the eyes of many economic agents, Liberex is a new channel, which 
could provide clients the same way other associations do: Confindustria and Confartig-
iato, Lions and Rotary, BNI and BEXB. They join as if these associations were ‘functional 
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equivalents’, showing not only a ‘social misunderstanding’ (non-existent interest for 
the social dimension of CCs or the overall alternative vision of the economy),  
 
#2.  Liberex has been criticized for its easiness (to give credit lines). If you 
have liquidity, you do not need Liberex. Compared to Sardex, I think this is 
the problem: here, we have networks that exist, independently from Liberex: 
the world of cooperatives, associations and the like…. 
 
but also a scant ‘technical understanding’ of the specific monetary architecture: 
 
#5. Brokers did a good job in explaining what the community is. The commu-
nity aims at loosen up, facilitate, the commercial transaction. But there is a 
problem in understanding the community, this is actually a problem in Li-
berex. I insist: the only way to ‘understand’ is to actively participate. If I close 
myself in and I do not participate, I won’t understand the community. You 
make the community by staying, being, spending time with others. You al-
ready have the virtual community, but with no physical relation, the com-
munity does not grow.  
 
Further strengthening this logic, as many members do, is to simply consider Liberex 
another local association for SMEs networking. This functional equivalence line of rea-
soning could get to an extreme where the economic interest to join relates to a sort of 
‘perceived protection’ from competition. The brokers’ job of selecting members for a 
better supply and demand matching is functional to protect market shares within the 
circuit. 
 
#1. The circuit was explained to me as the opening of a new ‘market’. Now, I 
see it as a shield for small retailers from the big market competition. 
 
#20. The idea that not too many lawyers were in the circuit attracted me. I 
was attracted by the idea that a diverse set of competencies was going to be 
the core of the project; they told us that not too many similar competencies 
were to be allowed within the circuit.  
 
Motivation to join: communitarian 
 
The communitarian driver in motivating membership scores high for Sardex, while it 
ranks low in Liberex where the presence of a strong social dimension tied up to the 
economic architecture strains to be recognized at first.  
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#3. The community? As it is for now, I do not feel it. 
 
#1. I do expect a service from Liberex, not a community. It is true that I miss 
the community, a direct relation with our clients, a sort of friendship, but… 
[it is the same]. Probably Liberex aims at creating this stuff, but I do not feel 
it. 
 
There is a light perception of what community means for economic exchange and a 
vague attraction to the role of a perfect community. A stark difference with LETS and 
Time banks is that there is no sign of emotional experience of the community (Smith 
and Lewis 2016), leaving room to more rational and instrumental motivations for par-
ticipation, and, following our line of interpretation, to a different sociality. At the mo-
ment, the community seems more a transient experience, but with a twist: 
 
#6. It is a nice experience, when it is over, it gives you something…a sort of 
awareness, a sense of community. 
 
#18. I believe these experiments are good ideas bearing potentialities to re-
ally change ‘things’. As for now, there is a huge individualism that clashes 
with the idea of community building. Maybe not now, but in short [I am con-
vinced that] people start to value important things and value all that rela-
tional capital that should be the core of any economic activity. 
 
This links back and helps explaining the prevailing kind of trust in Liberex. The com-
munity is still under construction, but is, anyhow, perceived as relevant for the overall 
functioning of the circuit. 
 
#8 Out there in the real world many people overextend themselves. Howev-
er, metaphorically speaking, the referee does not hold up the game immedi-
ately, he/she allows a few more steps and whistles only when you have gone 
too far; but in any case the referee can’t give you more than a red card. By 
contrast, in Liberex everyone can only take steps they can manage, it is not 
possible to do [i.e. to indebt yourself] more. Liberex leads you to reflect, to 
be self-aware; it makes you think about what you can do for the other circuit 
members to repay them [by recovering your debt through selling your prod-
ucts and services in the circuit]. It helps you to think about what you can give 
[sell] to others and what others can give [sell] to you. 
 
Motivation to join: territorial 
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More than an idealistic endorsement to an ‘imagined community’, here community 
can be inflected as ‘territorial’: it is more about engaging with local economic actors 
rather than join a cultural and political project as for Sardex.  
 
#9. I value Liberex because is open-minded, but to me it is not about the 
community. The winning idea is about an alternative economy, for a local 
territory. 
 
#12. The idea! It is the overall idea that I liked. I love thinking of an alterna-
tive circuit of credit that works for the local territory. [But] Of course, I also 
had an economic driver to join the circuit. 
 
#13. We love contributing to the growth of the local territory, because we 
live on it, we are tied to it, we see it growing. Walking all together leads to 
benefit for all, even in Euros.  
 
In Sardex, personal and community identities mix up in an interplay that makes par-
ticipation meaningful to individuals in addition to social and economic resilience. In Li-
berex, a more individualistic framing of economic action, nevertheless, leads to an 
open and flexible, territorial and visible approach to business: 
 
#1. Being a family? This is not what we are looking for, but we are open to 
becoming a family. We like Liberex because you realize you enter a relational 
network, but it is evident that it is your call to show your value, not Liberex’s. 
 
#21. It is all about territoriality. We are leader in our territory and we saw in 
Liberex a way to act differently with other local firms. 
 
#13. Yes, it was an economic driver that made me try Liberex, but I liked the 
overall idea of an alternative to the banking system. This is one of the things 
that made me decide: an alternative form of credit and the idea of local de-
velopment for the territory. 
 
#8: For me, it was a nice balance between social and instrumental motives. 
We can call it a draw. It is a nice, constructive and intelligent way to increase 
your turnover without turn into hustling for new clients…the main thing you 
have to do is reach out, get to know people, talking… 
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A concluding remark should not only underline the relative younger age of the sister 
circuit, but also the different institutional context that could leverage future develop-
ments. In Liberex, there is no specific community, it does not reflect a strong territorial 
identity nor is it identified with a cultural project, but it is an economic aggregate 
where different motivations and goals start to converge. By now, we can think of the 
community as an on-going learning process that might lead to the development of a 
more local and territorial identity project by virtue of a much stronger role of Liberex 
SPA. In a nutshell, our findings stand against the idea that the same monetary architec-
ture comes along with a similar sociality in different territories, negatively supporting 
our central research question. Our contribution helps explaining why the institutional 
and relational contexts are so important for the concrete functioning and embodiment 
of the same monetary architecture. 
 
 
4. The social life of Liberex 
 
Viviana Zelizer (2005) points out that novel circuits of commerce arise as a culturally 
embedded solution to social problems triggered by the very functioning of capitalism. 
Sardex and Liberex are clear-cut examples of (different) cultural embedded solutions 
framed within a precise set of monetary rules that efficiently answers – especially in 
the Sardinian case – to those problems.  
Sardex’s response is economically efficient because it embodies a new type of cur-
rency that works in complement with the official currency, easing the economic life of 
troubled territory. It is also a socially efficient answer to impersonal and imperfect 
markets, resuscitating the value of the community for local exchanges and supple-
menting market deficits. Sardex’s mutual credit scheme re-embeds economic exchange 
into social relations but, at the same time, it self-protects from voluntarism or govern-
ment interventions – the main causes of failure among other CCs arrangements. 
The comparison of two Italian experiences reveals that the social dimension, which 
is intrinsically intertwined to the economic one, takes different shapes depending on 
their relational and institutional contexts. Drawing on the comparison of three analytic 
characteristics (circuit, trust and community), we found that under the same monetary 
architecture there are different understandings and behaviours, varying combinations 
of trust and social capital, empowerment and engagement, within the community. In 
other words, the same monetary scheme could be associated with an altered sociality, 
that is to say a different social life.  
So, if it is true that mutual credit systems show a strong built-in social dimension, 
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precisely manifested through its own sociality (Doria and Fantacci 2018), which derives 
from the monetary architecture, how is it possible to empirically find two such differ-
ent forms of sociality under the same monetary scheme? First of all, differences are 
because sociality is not entirely determined by the monetary scheme, but is also 
shaped by the hosting relational and institutional contexts. As for technology, the who 
and where are relevant for the overall adoption and functioning: factors other than the 
monetary scheme are at work. 
Second, a monetary sociality is tightly intertwined with levels of social capital: 
whether the reservoirs of trust (both individualized or generalized) are high or low, the 
role of organizers and community changes. If reservoirs in Emilia-Romagna are not crit-
ical, there is no need to see and experience the community as ‘something more’ than 
just the organizers doing ‘their’ job as the signed contract describes. Thus, a more indi-
vidualist attitude and a linking form of social capital prevail, leaving room to interpret 
the mutual credit system as a functional equivalent to other networking associations. 
However, building on their accountability role, the organizers bolster trusting relations 
over time. 
Third, the answer goes back, again, to the social relations underlying, and triggered 
by, the mutual credit system as well as the ‘social misunderstanding’ of the rules of the 
game. If creditors and debtors relations are not considered intrinsically ‘social’, the rel-
evance of a community sustaining economic transactions goes lost, paving the way for 
individualistic and instrumental economic actions and resulting in a misalignment with 
the monetary architecture. When the rules of the game are misunderstood, also the 
nature of money is misinterpreted and its sociological implications go unrecognized 
(see 1.2).  
We expected Liberex to be kin to Sardex, but it ends up resulting more of an ac-
quaintance. Sharing the same monetary architecture should have allowed for a very 
similar social life, while it revealed quite substantial differences, opening the floor for 
future studies and offering interesting insights about the sustainability of existing and 
prospective monetary arrangements. 
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